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ABSTRACT
For the past several decades the South has moved toward one-party Republican control,
and yet the mega-southern state of Florida has not kept pace with the greater Southern
Republican realignment for candidates running for statewide office. Instead, Florida has
exhibited a Southern lag, where rural counties maintain higher Democratic registration
than voting levels in supporting Democratic candidates for governor and U.S. Senate in the
same general election year. There has been a gradual regional dealignment occurring in
rural counties that are closer to the Deep Southern states of Alabama and Georgia. Using a
range of aggregate Florida county election and registration data, research found the
percentage of white voters and percentage of registered Democrats that comprise counties
effect the Democratic deviation. These results have implications for campaign strategy and
can be used in campaign targeting efforts.
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1. Introduction
In a span of 50 years, the South has experienced a political transition away from
being so staunchly Democratic, where voters would rather “vote for a yellow dog” than a
Republican, to being the Republican base that has redefined Southern, and American,
politics. Southern states went from supporting President Franklin Roosevelt and his
populist agenda to splintering off1 on racial issues with President Harry Truman’s
desegregation of the military, to gradually embracing the more conservative paradigm of
religion and economic agenda of the Republican Party. The South eventually became the
stronghold of Republican support and produced some of its most notable players from
Georgians Newt Gingrich and Ralph Reed in the mid 1990’s to Senator Jim DeMint of South
Carolina today.
Throughout this thesis the South is defined as the eleven ex-Confederate, or
secession, states of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. It is a standard definition that
many respected researchers on elections and partisanship have used (see, Black and Black
1982, 1987, 1992, 2002; Key 1949, 1958; Miller and Shanks 1996; Sundquist 1973). The
South is divided into two sub-regions: the Deep South and the Peripheral South. The Deep
South is comprised of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina which
possess the largest black populations2, are the most insular, and contain the most
reactionary white populations (McKee, 2012). The Peripheral South is made up of Florida,

1

Southern politicians and voters briefly left the Democratic Party to become Dixiecrats or
the States’ Rights Party.
2 For more on these classifications see V. O. Key, 1949 and Black and Black, 1987.
1

as well as Arkansas, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia, which comprise
relatively smaller black populations. The Deep South states of Alabama and Georgia and the
Peripheral South state of Florida are the focus of this study. And unlike other states in the
Peripheral South, Florida became the first Southern state with an urban majority and was
most unique in attracting many military installations and high number of Northern
transplants for its climate for retirement (Black and Black, 1987) which further define it
from the other Peripheral states.
In addition to these categories, the state of Florida will be described in five regional
terms throughout the paper to address geographic areas and voting trends between areas:
Panhandle/Northeast, Central, West Coastal, East Coastal, and South Florida. The
Panhandle/Northeast3 refers to the northernmost counties in the state with large black
populations, but low representation of other minority voters; in this way the
Panhandle/Northeast resembles the Deep South demographics more than other regions.
Duval County (home to Jacksonville) is its largest urban area with 537,462 voters as of
2006, with 143,909 registered black voters (26.8%). And due to Duval’s proximity to
Georgia, it is expected to exhibit similar voting trends. Moving southward down into the
state is the Central region, which includes Orlando as its metropolitan city, a growing (nonCuban) Latino population, as well as agricultural areas. The West Coastal region includes
Tampa, St. Petersburg and Ft. Myers, while the East Coastal includes the NASA4 Space
Coast. And finally South Florida which includes the metropolitan cites of Ft. Lauderdale,
West Palm Beach and Miami, high population of blacks, and Latinos and Cubans (see figure

3

Interestingly, the number of registered voters in the Panhandle/Northeast is nearly the
same as that of the entire state of Alabama.
4 National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
2

1.1). Most transplants moved to Central, Coastal and South Florida; while the
Panhandle/Northeast maintained its roots and received transplants from the neighboring
Southern states (Black and Black, 2002; Jeffreys, 2005).

Panhandle/Northeast
Central
West Coastal
East Coastal
South Florida

Figure 1.1 Florida Regions, by county

In those decades between Dixiecrats and the Contract with America (1994), the
South began to dealign itself with Democrats, and began switching party identification5 and

5

Many Southern states do not require registration by party – Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia,
Mississippi, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. Of the Deep South states, only
Louisiana records registration by party.
3

voting for candidates of both parties. Political scientists have devoted a good deal of
research into identifying and understanding Southern voting trends and patterns in states
and in the electorate with the aim to determine significant factors that motivate voters,
both individually or in aggregate, to switch party allegiance (Black and Black 1992;
Carmines and Stanley 1990; Miller and Shanks 1996; Petrocik 1987; Stanley 1988). Much
of the research has been conducted on federal offices- comparing presidential results with
those of specific United States (U.S.) congressional representative outcomes (Bullock,
Hoffman and Gaddie 2005; Carsey 2004; Highton 2000; Kenney and Tom 1984). There
have only been a handful of studies that have conducted ticket splitting research on a state
level (Beck et al., 1992; Craig et al, 1999; Mulligan, 2011). While this type of comparison is
useful, there has been little research on county aggregate election results on the
willingness of voters to swing support for both Republicans and Democrats for statewide
offices in the same years. This lack of attention given to state and county dynamics in
elections can largely be attributed to the difficulty of obtaining data due to state election
laws or difficulty obtaining results. The lack of analysis at the state level, Florida in
particular and countywide level is the impetus to this research. Offices such as U.S. Senate
and governors have been infrequently studied together. But this paring should be included
in the research evaluating the voting deviations (here using Democratic candidates in the
South) since these offices avoid the complications surrounding gerrymandered districts
typically found in Congressional races, or ideologically extreme districts, which may skew
analysis.
Comparing senatorial and gubernatorial elections should provide insight into voting
trends at the county level. This is in part due to their similarities: statewide constituency,
4

highly visible candidates, and high levels of campaign spending, as well as their differences,
the responsibility of the office differs in the branch and level of government each represent.
Atkeson and Randall (1995) found that state electorates hold their governors accountable
for state economic conditions to the exclusion of national forces such as presidential
approval and evaluations of the national economy which were more attributed to senators.
Where Stein (1990) stated that expectations are consistent with a federalist perspective of
vote choice in midterm elections whereby voters recognize and react to the differing
responsibilities and circumstances of different branches and levels of government. A
majority of research narrowly focuses attention to the president and congressional
contests. However, in doing so researchers have selected a pair that is quite
unrepresentative of the situation voters typically faces (Burden, 1998). By evaluating
countywide aggregate data, this analysis eliminates the effects of gerrymandering between
precincts and congressional lines commonly used to examine two offices. This analysis also
compares between federal and state level offices rather than the more common federal and
federal offices. There is an expectation that voters differentiate between federal policies
undertaken by senatorial candidates and economic issues from gubernatorial candidates.
Florida gubernatorial races occur during midterm election years and typically have
lower turnout than Presidential year elections. This provides an additional layer in
evaluating county-level support for the Democratic candidates running for statewide
offices. For one thing, divided control emerges from time to time, usually as a result of
midterm election reversals for presidential approval (Beck, 1992). Evidence of this trend
can be seen in the election years examined here. And empirical studies by Alesina and
Rosenthal (1989), Erikson (1990), and Alesina, Londregan, and Rosenthal (1993) have
5

shown the model of midterm effect performs at least as well and often better than the
traditional empirical voting models that emphasize incumbency advantage and
retrospective voting on the state of economy (Burden and Kimball, 1998).
Here these effects will be evaluated by analyzing the absolute value of the percent of
votes for the Democratic office minus the percent Democratic registration of the same year
for each county. The senatorial and gubernatorial candidate vote percentages are evaluated
for each of the following years: 1994, 1998, and 2006 which were when a federal race and a
statewide race were occurring at the same time without the presence of presidential
candidates.
Florida has the distinction of being a Southern state that operates outside of
traditional Southern trends at the statewide level. Until 2010, Florida had not voted
straight Republican when both office of Senate and Governor were on the ballot, unlike
other states in the South. It is large in both land mass and population which includes a
dense universe of voters and counties with a comprehensive election and registration data
available for studying the aggregate effects election results. Florida provides an interesting
universe to study voting patterns since it is in the South and has both Southern and nonSouthern regions, qualities and populations. As of July 2012, Florida6 had 11,483,461
registered voters, with as few as 4,538 in Lafayette County to 1,249,428 in Miami-Dade
County. Small counties like Lafayette are expected to act similarly to traditional southern
conservative states with a Southern lag effect of moving toward solid Republican support,
whereas counties like Miami-Dade and Broward are expected to continue to vary support,

6

From the Florida Department of Elections. https://doe.dos.state.fl.us/voter-

registration/statistics/elections.shtml#top
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due in part to high population and high diversity. Unlike other Southern states,
generational replacement and partisan conversion are not the key factor in transforming
Florida politics (Jeffreys, 2005). By using Florida counties to drill down into election data
and examine voting trends in geographic regions that border the Deep South, this research
studies aggregate voting patterns in whole counties rather than the more commonly
districted, gerrymandered-centered research.
1.1 Purpose of the study
The South turned from a solid Democratic to a Republican stronghold. The
splintering divide that began with Truman took hold, in earnest, at the presidential level in
1980 with the election of Ronald Reagan, and then continued to move down the ballot over
the decades to Congressman, governors and finally to state legislatures. Now the majority
of these states are solidly Republican. Florida, however, has not kept pace with these other
Southern states in their realignment toward Republican representation. Florida did move
along with the South in its support for Reagan in 1980 but, unlike most Southern states, it
continues to elect Democratic candidates for statewide office. Florida maintains
Democratic representation at the statewide level: with both a Democratic Senator and
governor until 1994 and then a Democratic Senator with a Republican governor and
Senator.
Whereas Florida is one of the nation’s top five most populous states, it still has many
small rural counties7 (in 2006, 34 counties, or 51%, fell into this criteria) that share traits
with traditional Southern states (e.g., agricultural, high percentage white population, etc.),

7

Rural counties being defined as having less than 70,000 registered voters.
7

especially in those adjacent to the Deep South states. According to McKee (2010) the
political behavior of rural residents has been conspicuously absent thus far in a growing
literature on the political role of place. It is anticipated these counties have been moving
similarly to the South’s support for Republican political leadership, but many of these
counties have not fully dealigned with Democratic candidates at the statewide level and
still maintain high Democratic registration, even though it is steadily on the decline (see
table 1.1). In fact, in as late as 2006, 82% of its rural counties still sustained Democratic
registration of over 50%. Yet these rural counties are shifting away from Democrats in
statewide representation, and it is anticipated that they will eventually realign with
Republicans because they share: geographic proximity, economic and racial similarities,
and in some case media markets which permeate Deep Southern political rhetoric and
campaign communications.
Table 1.1 Net Difference of Democrats and Republican Florida Voters, 1994-2006
(%)
Media Market
Miami
West Palm Beach
Ft. Myers
Tampa
Orlando
Jacksonville
Gainesville
Tallahassee
Panama City
Pensacola
TOTAL

Net Democrat
1994
1998
2006
15.3
13.7
15.2
0.7
2.4
6.6
-17.6
-16.4
-17.3
-0.8
-1.4
-1.5
-4.3
-3.5
-1.8
24.7
13.1
-0.1
38.6
33.9
24.3
54.1
49.2
38.7
52.8
38.9
9.9
9.5
-4.8
-19.4
7.1
5.0
2.7

8

1.2 Expected Results
It is expected that rural counties, will demonstrate a Southern lag that illustrates
Democratic deviation between Democratic registration versus Democratic vote for
candidates. Even as Democratic registration declines, this deviation will continue to be
evident as these counties move toward Republican realignment following the Deep South
model. By using Democratic absolute deviation voting trends for both parties for senatorial
and gubernatorial candidates beginning in 1994 to 2006 will attempt to prove this
hypothesis. These results should be concentrated in the Panhandle/Northeast region of the
state which, as previously noted, is adjacent to Deep South states and in other rural,
predominantly white counties. Urban counties which are further away from the Deep South
will be less likely to follow traditional Southern voting trends of Democratic dealignment
due in part to their demographics which do not reflect traditional Southern counties with
its higher numbers of transplants, Latinos, tourism and a host of other factors. By analyzing
the highly visible statewide races of senate and governor, there should be discernible
evidence of Democratic deviation in counties which are rural, with high percentage of
white voters, Democratic voters and voters in the Pensacola-Mobile, AL, TallahasseeThomasville-GA, Panama City, Jacksonville, and Gainesville media markets with particular
emphasis on the two which share media markets with Alabama and Georgia.
Counties with high white voter percentages should effect the deviation, particularly
those with higher black voter populations (those with 10% or more black registration)
because this demographic make-up mirrors that seen in the Deep South- which also have a
history of racial tensions dating back to slavery, the Confederacy, and segregation. The
media markets group geographic areas which are close to one another and receive the
9

same TV campaign communication which should effect candidate support. And two of the
media markets in the Panhandle region have overlapping borders with the Deep South. So
the Pensacola-Mobile, AL should demonstrate even greater Democratic deviation due to it
bordering Alabama on two sides (west and north) and it receives additional Alabama
campaign ads or communication, and Alabama has realigned to the Republican Party. While
the Tallahassee-Thomasville, GA media market should display, although less so, similar
changes, because Georgia was slower to move to complete Republican representation at
the statewide level and some of the counties in this market have high percentages of black
voters.
In short, this study will explain a trend of Democratic deviation between
registration and support for Democratic candidates in rural, high white counties due to a
Southern lag effect and dealignment from the Democratic Party.

2. Southern lag
There is a vast amount of political science research devoted to the dealignment of
the Democratic Party and the momentum to support the Republican Party and the surge of
Republican voting in the South is well documented (Aistrup, 1996; Black and Black 1982,
1987, 1992, 2002, 2007; Lubin 2004; Osborne 2011; Stanley 1988). Yet as V.O. Key (1949)
pointed out, it has been top down politics in the South beginning with president and
trickling down the ballot.
The history of partisan change over the last 50 years involves the reversal of the
Democratic Party’s popularity and strength in the South to the transfer of power to the
Republican Party due to white conservative voters (or traditional Southern voters)

10

(Carmines and Stanley, 1990). Republicans have attracted huge majorities of white
conservatives and have neutralized the advantages of Democrats with white moderates
(Black and Black, 2007). As suggested by Born (2000), white Southerners since as early as
Brown v. Board of Education (1954) began moving toward Republicans for president, but
maintained their loyalty toward local or “home-grown” Democrats. Today there is little
party deviation between president and congress in the South (outside of metropolitan
areas) and more are voting in Republican statewide blocs similar to those held by
Democrats pre-Brown v. Board of Education. Voters convinced that their local Democratic
nominee was cut from the national liberal mold are more likely to vote Republican (Black
and Black 1987; Glaser 1996).
2.1 Dealignment
The South used Democratic partisan cues for straight Democratic ticket voting for
decades. Often most elections were decided during the primaries because there were no
Republican challengers (Black and Black, 1982). But over the past 30 years, Southern states
and counties began to shift away from straight Democratic tickets to straight Republican
tickets. The culminating factors in Democratic dealignment in the South began with racial
tension intensified by Brown v. Board of Education, the Civil Rights Act of 1957, the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Political realignments generally
depend on two factors- one is a change among party elites, and the other is fertile soil in the
mass public's attitudes (Valentino and Sears, 2005). President Richard Nixon is credited for
devising the Southern Strategy by exploiting racial tensions to gain Southern support from
Democrats who felt disenfranchised by President Johnson’s Civil Rights Act. The party
elites had been working on its strategy for a decade when it finally gained its footing among
11

Southern white voters during Reagan’s bid for the White House, which proved pivotal as
the Republican turning point in the South. Now things have changed so much that the South
is once again exceptional, but this time because it is so overwhelmingly Republican (McKee,
2012).
Alabama’s realignment to the Republican Party began in 1980 by supporting Reagan
and electing Jeremiah Denton as its first Republican governor since Reconstruction. And
since 1980, Alabama has consistently supported Republican presidential candidates. In
1980, Georgia also voted its first Republican Senator (Mack Mattingly) since
Reconstruction but it lagged behind Alabama, and the rest of the South, and swung its
support to native-son President Jimmy Carter. But only four years later, Georgia gave its
support to Reagan, yet in1992 it cast its electoral votes for Bill Clinton- which would be the
last time Georgia would support a Democratic presidential candidate.
The midterm election of 1994 was a terrible year for Democrats, particularly in the
South. But it would be a changing of the tides for Republicans in the South, a trend which
would continue and strengthen throughout the decade into the present. In 1994, Southern
white support for Republican (GOP) candidates surged to record levels enabling the GOP to
achieve majority status in the region's U.S. Senate and House delegations, and make
substantial gains in southern state legislatures (Black and Black 2002). In fact, the
exceptional 16-seat Southern shift to the GOP in 1994 constituted more seats than
Republicans had gained in the three previous Democratic mid-terms combined (Bullock et
al., 2005). The Southern realignment toward Republicans had taken hold and after the
Republicans won control of both houses, Alabama Democratic U.S. Senator Richard Shelby
switched his party affiliation to Republican, in what would mark a growing trend in the
12

Democratic Party’s Southern defection. By 2002, both Alabama and Georgia would solidly
vote for Republican candidates at the statewide level. The South’s political landscape is
shifting in ways that make it worthwhile to ask whether Democrats will, in the foreseeable
future, be able to compete effectively in Southern statewide elections (Hayes and McKee,
2008).
Table 2.1 Florida Voter Registration by Party and Region
Statewide

Panhandle/NE
(19%)

Rest of Florida
(81%)

(%)
Party
Registration
Democrat
Republican
Independent

1994
49.0
41.9
8.6

1998
45.0
40.0
15.0

2006
40.4
37.7
21.8

1994
61.9
31.5
6.0

1998
54.1
34.6
11.3

2006
44.0
39.7
16.3

1994
45.9
44.3
9.3

1998
42.8
41.4
15.8

2006
39.6
37.3
23.2

Net Dem-Rep

7.1

5.0

2.7

30.4

19.6

4.4

1.6

1.4

2.3

Placed in the red state - blue state context in the 2000 and 2004 presidential
elections, it is apparent that the polarization of rural and urban voters contributed to
lopsided election outcomes in these states, whereas the most competitive states exhibited
no rural-urban divide in vote choice (McKee, 2008). But the tides really began to turn with
the initial desertion and continued realignment of about one-sixth of the white voters in the
South who, until 1994, stood by Democratic congressional candidates even as they voted
for Republican presidential nominees. Prior to 1994, a sizable share of the white electorate
distinguished between Democratic congressional candidates and presidential candidates;
since 1994 that distinction has been swept away (Bullock et al., 2005).
According to Craig et al. (1999), Floridians do not always see their own states
political leaders as falling within the overarching bonds of traditional partisanship, and on
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the whole, continue to appraise leaders largely according to their partisan affiliation “(or
lack of it).” Parties adjust their policies and candidacies to counteract losses in support
among their electorate, and as a result, former party followers who have left the ranks
revise their evaluations and return (Fiorina 2002). Thereby creating a party lag in which it
takes time for the party to react to the changing electorate. It is possible that the issues
associated with party transformations may help to change the social images of the parties
for many citizens (Carsey and Layman 2006). Similar to party lag, there is expected to be a
regional lag in voting trends, particularly in rural and high white voter concentrated
counties.
Table 2.2 Florida Voter Registration by Media Market and Party
(%)
Media Market
Miami
West Palm Beach
Ft. Myers
Tampa
Orlando
Jacksonville
Gainesville
Tallahassee/GA
Panama City
Pensacola/Mobile
TOTAL

Democrat
1994 1998 2006
52.6 49.1 45.8
44.6 42.8 41.6
36.9 33.9 29.4
44.7 41.2 37.9
43.6 40.6 37.6
59.2 50.6 41.3
64.7 60.2 52.3
73.4 70.4 63.5
74.1 64.8 48.3
51.8 41.6 31.9
49.0 45.0 40.4

Republican
1994 1998 2006
37.3 35.4 30.6
43.9 40.5 35.1
54.5 50.4 46.8
45.5 42.6 39.4
47.8 44.1 39.4
34.4 37.4 41.4
26.1 26.3 28.0
19.3 21.3 24.8
21.3 25.8 38.3
42.2 46.5 51.3
41.9 40.0 37.7

Independent
1994 1998 2006
9.6 15.5 23.7
11.0 16.7 23.3
8.3 15.7 23.8
9.3 16.2 22.7
7.9 15.3 22.9
6.0 12.0 17.4
8.3 13.5 19.7
6.5
8.3 11.7
3.8
9.4 13.4
5.7 11.9 16.8
8.6 15.0 21.8

The number of Florida voters with loose partisan ties has contributed to increasing
competitiveness in the state (Jefferys, 2005). Voters mix and match partisan candidates
based on their policy shopping list for their desired policy or ideological outcomes. Voters
use different criteria to gauge their expectations of the office or race at that point in time
based on one or more factors which could include candidate ideology, issue voting,
14

candidate communication and various other variables. So candidates are measured on
evaluation variables, with each the voter comparing the Republican and Democratic
candidates in terms of their “good points” (Lewis-Beck et al, 2008). Unlike the rest of the
South, the diversity and size of Florida necessitates its candidates to be less extreme at the
statewide level and more moderate which has insulated it from the Southern Republican
realignment, particularly in the Deep South. Candidates for senate and governor are
compelled to position themselves as centrist to appeal to a broad spectrum of persuadable
voters.
Many residents in densely populated [Florida] counties share a common political
rootlessness; they are not blinded by Southern tradition and often have weaker partisan
ties derived from their home state (Jeffreys, 2005). Less populated counties may still have
the remnants of Southern Democrats (pre-Reagan) but also be decreasing in its partisan
intensity; the Democratic vote deviation should demonstrate this trend. In so far as
Florida’s total registered voters are concerned, it had 6.6 million in 1994, 8.2 million in
1998, and 10.2 million in 2006. In comparison, in 1994 and 1998 Florida had
approximately the same number of registered voters as the Deep South states of Alabama,
Georgia and South Carolina combined. And by 2006, it was nearly equal to those three
states plus half the state of Mississippi8. Even as the Deep South grows, Florida continues to
surpass them and attract more citizens. And the 20th century transformation of state
demographics created a Florida population that is a departure from traditional Southern
populations (Jeffreys, 2005).

8

Voter registration information obtained from the South Carolina Secretary of State

website. http://www.state.sc.us/scsec/sta98.htm.
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2.2 Factors Influencing Realignment
The white South has not only given up its solid support for the Democrats, but had
become distinctly more Republican than the rest of the country (Osborne et al., 2011). As
white Southerners have, in increasing numbers, moved into the Republican Party, African
Americans have become a solidly Democratic constituency. This has dramatically reshaped
the distribution of party identification in the South (Hayes and McKee, 2008). Black voters
make up a high percentage of the minority population in the Deep South, and at higher
numbers proportionally. It is these same demographic characteristics that are seen in the
Panhandle/Northeast. But as a whole, Hispanics are the “majority minority” in Florida.
The Republican reversal of party control has entailed the realignment of white
voters. Republicans have attracted huge majorities of white conservatives and have
neutralized the advantages of Democrats with white moderates (Black and Black, 2007).
These changes have typically occurred in regions where there are high percentages of black
voters in the region. Republicans are almost all white, and blacks are the dominant core of
the southern Democratic Party (Black and Black 2002). By 2006, white voters made up
84% of the Florida Republican Party, while Hispanic accounted for 11%, and blacks
comprised 2%. Contrast that with the Democratic Party of Florida in the same year which
was comprised of 63% white voters, nearly a quarter of whom were black voters (24%)
and 9% were Latino.
Florida’s traditional Southern counties (those which are low in diversity, low
population, rural, etc.) have dealigned with Democrats as seen through registration
numbers and candidate vote percentage. This can be attributed in part to the fact that the
Democratic registration in this region has dropped -26 net points from Republican
16

registration from 1994 to 2006, while the rest of the state has not seen a significant change.
These counties have been gradually losing strength in supporting Democratic candidates
beyond what their county registration numbers indicate.
Many of the counties are in this region are rural and lack diversity of non-black
minority voters which is below 7.5% in as late as 2006. There are counties in the
Panhandle/Northeast region with high black registration; and overall, the region has
higher percentage of black voters than does the rest of the state, with 15 to 16% during the
years being examined. A few counties9 in the Tallahassee metro area that have black
registration above 30% should show little to no effects from any Southern lag effects,
although the Tallahassee media market is shared with parts of Georgia (see table 2.3).
Table 2.3 Florida Voter Registration by Ethnicity and Region
Ethnicity (%)
White Voters
Black Voters
Other Voters

Statewide
1994 1998 2006
89.1 80.5 72.0
9.4 10.6 12.0
1.5
9.4 16.1

Panhandle/Northeast
1994 1998 2006
83.9
81.0
76.6
14.9
15.6
16.3
1.2
4.0
7.1

Rest of Florida
1994 1998 2006
90.3 80.4 70.9
8.1
9.4 10.9
1.6 10.7 18.2

Levernier and Barilla’s (2006) study on determining how region, demographics, and
economic characteristics affected county-level voting patterns in the 2000 presidential
election indicated that although economic and demographic characteristics were important
causes of the voting patterns, the regional location of a county was also important;
suggesting that unobserved region-specific cultural characteristics were at play. This study
supports the theory that counties located adjacent to the Deep South should expect to
9

For example, Gadsden County in the Tallahassee area had the highest black percentage of

any county in the state at 55% in 1998 and 2006.
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exhibit similar cultural tendencies that would add to the explanation of why counties in
Panhandle/Northeast region have continued to support mixed statewide representation
and how it is changing toward Republican domination. Because partisanship is an enduring
political characteristic usually resistant to sudden alteration (Campbell et al. 1960; Green
et al. 2002), the long-term pattern of partisanship shows strong evidence of political
change among rural voters. Rural voters tend to be morally and socially conservative, but
they might also have good reasons to vote with Democrats on matters of economic
importance. Nevertheless, data show that their voting loyalty is growing more Republican
(Gimpel and Karnes, 2006)
McCarty et al. (2005) put forth that geographic relocation from a community in
which one’s party identification is in the majority to a community in which one’s
partisanship is in the minority triggers changes in one’s partisanship and found that
Democrats who moved to social environments in which their predispositions met greater
Republican opposition than in the environments in which they grew up were more likely to
become Republicans. This is especially relevant to Florida which attracts new population
growth through immigration, retirees, who have greater flexibility in choosing where they
live, and job seekers, who have less flexibility; this continuous flow of transplants, which
tend to reside near each other and carry their native voting behaviors with them, can
influence county voting trends. Americans have become more mobile, they have
consciously chosen to relocate into communities with politically likeminded neighbors
(Oppenheimer, 2005). From this it is supposed that as more voters move into areas faster
than the local county population is growing, the new voters will either influence or usurp
local voting tendencies. For example, in Orange County (home to Orlando) the inflow of
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non-Cuban Latinos, who are Democratic leaning supporters, has altered the once
Republican area to one which swings support to both parties. This kind of self-sorting
reinforces political similarities within counties and compounds the observable regional
electoral effects such as moving toward Republican realignment. As counties move their
support it becomes a predictive indicator of partisan change. If the support from counties
for the Democratic Party continues to dwindle, eventually expectations shift for these
counties to completely dealign, if not realign.
As discussed earlier, these counties share common geographic and demographic
traits. This paper tests the effects of counties grouped by media markets which political
campaigns use to target television communication. There is substantial research (Beck et
al., 1992; Burden and Kimball, 2002; Roscoe, 2003; Gimpel, et al., 2004; Mulligan, 2011)
supporting that fact that increased campaign media (i.e., print, radio, and TV
advertisements) is a significant factor for voters to deviate from party allegiance and
support candidates regardless of party. And although increased TV media will certainly
increase a candidate’s ability to persuade weak partisans to vote contrary to their party
affiliations, it may not be observable why – if it is from incumbency, name recognition,
issue alignment, ad repetition or some other reason. This is due to the limitation on
gathering information to adequately study the effects given the difficulties obtaining the
amounts of media used and paid for by candidates and third-party supporters. Past
research has uncovered several aspects of the influence of media on voting. Roscoe (2003)
cites evidence that voters are more willing to swing support when individuals are more
reliant on a vast variety of media and messages. Suggesting that the more candidates utilize
media, the more it will attract voters to abandon party ties and pick up support. And so,
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candidates who outspend their opponents are more visible to voters and better able to
attract voters from the other party and creating more deviation (Mulligan, 2001). It is
expected that counties in a defined media market will operate similarly, although not the
same, in part because they receive the same targeted messages (or lack thereof, if
candidates choose not to communicate there through TV). This paper focuses on the effects
campaign communications counties are likely to receive as a group and posits that those
counties within the Panhandle/Northeast region which share media markets with the Deep
South will be more inclined to exhibit Southern lag demonstrated through the Democratic
deviation variable.
Table 2.4 Florida Voter Registration by Media Market and Ethnicity
(%)
Media Market
Miami
West Palm Beach
Ft. Myers
Tampa
Orlando
Jacksonville
Gainesville
Tallahassee
Panama City
Pensacola
TOTAL

White Voters
1994 1998 2006
83.6
58.0 43.2
93.3
88.7 80.7
95.8
92.2 87.3
93.1
89.1 81.9
90.5
85.2 74.2
81.8
79.2 73.8
87.7
82.9 75.8
75.5
72.2 68.5
90.1
88.1 86.6
89.3
86.0 82.8
89.1
80.5 72.0

Black Voters
1994 1998 2006
14.4 16.2 18.9
6.5
7.9
9.6
3.0
3.6
3.8
5.8
6.7
7.9
6.6
8.0
9.6
17.1 17.4 18.6
10.8 12.0 13.0
23.1 24.9 25.4
9.6
9.8
9.2
9.3 10.7 10.9
9.4 10.6 12.0

All Other Voters
1994 1998 2006
2.0 26.1 37.8
0.2
4.0
9.7
1.3
5.0
8.9
1.1
4.3 10.1
2.9
7.8 16.2
1.1
4.2
7.6
1.5
5.4 11.2
1.4
3.5
6.2
0.4
2.6
4.2
1.4
4.0
6.3
1.5
9.4 16.1

There are ten media markets in the state of Florida. Each surrounds a general
population for candidates to target and each varying in cost to advertise (being most
expensive in the Tampa and Miami media markets and least expensive in Gainesville). The
media markets are described below with the counties in each, voter population, percent
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white voters, and political party registration lead. The Florida media markets are (moving
from the southern part of the state northward):
•

Miami-Ft. Lauderdale (“Miami”) encompasses 3 counties – Broward, Miami-Dade
and Monroe. In 2006, it had 2,060,875 registered voters, and white voters held a +5
point plurality over Hispanic voters (43% to 38%), while black voters accounted for
19% of the market. In 1994 and 2006, Democrats held a +15 point advantage over
Republicans.

•

West Palm Beach-Ft. Pierce (“West Palm Beach”) contains 5 counties- Indian River,
Martin, Okeechobee, Palm Beach, and St. Lucie. In 2006, it had 1,115,474 registered
voters, and white voters accounted for 81% of the market. In 1994, Democrats only
held a +1 point advantage, while in 2006, Democrats held a +7 point advantage over
Republicans.

•

Ft. Myers-Naples (“Ft. Myers”) includes 5 counties – Charlotte, Collier, DeSoto,
Glades, Hendry, and Lee. In 2006, it had 667,927 registered voters, and white voters
represented 87% of the market. In 1994 and 2006, Republicans held a +18 point
advantage over Democrats.

•

Tampa-St. Petersburg (“Tampa”) encompasses 10 counties – Citrus, Hardee,
Hernando, Highlands, Hillsborough, Manatee, Pasco, Pinellas, Polk, and Sarasota. In
2006, it had 2,547,674 registered voters, and white voters represented 82% of the
market. In 1994 and 2006, Republicans held a +1 point advantage over Democrats.

•

Orlando-Daytona Beach-Melbourne (“Orlando”) includes counties- Brevard, Flagler,
Lake, Marion, Orange, Osceola, Seminole, Sumter, and Volusia. In 2006, it had
2,026,101 registered voters, and white voters represented 74% of the market, while
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Latinos represented 16%. In 1994, Republicans held a +4 point advantage, while in
2006, Republicans held a +1 point advantage over Democrats.
The next five media markets are all located within the Panhandle/Northeast region of the
state.
•

Jacksonville contains 9 counties- Baker, Bradford, Clay, Columbia, Duval, Nassau,
Putnam, St. Johns, and Union. In 2006, it had 931,879 registered voters, and white
voters accounted for 74% of the market while black voters represented 19%. In
1994 Democrats held a +25 point advantage, but by 2006, there was no net
advantage between Democrats and Republicans.

•

Gainesville includes 4 counties- Alachua, Dixie, Gilchrist, and Levy. In 2006, it had
191,710 registered voters, and white voters accounted for 76% of the market while
black voters represented 13%. In 1994 it was a +39 point advantage for Democrats,
and then in 2006, Democrats held a +24 point advantage over Republicans.

•

Tallahassee, FL-Thomasville, GA (“Tallahassee”) encompasses 10 counties- Gadsden,
Hamilton, Jefferson, Lafayette, Leon, Madison, Suwannee, Taylor, and Wakulla. In
2006, it had 258,002 registered voters, and white voters accounted for 68% of the
market while black voters represented 25%. In 1994, Democrats had a +54 point
advantage over Republicans, while in 2006, Democrats held a +39 point advantage
over Republicans.

•

Panama City holds 9 counties- Bay, Calhoun, Franklin, Gulf, Holmes, Jackson, Liberty,
Walton, and Washington. In 2006, it had 223,918 registered voters, and white voters
accounted for 87% of the media market. In 1994 it had a +53 point advantage, but
by 2006, Democrats held a +10 point advantage over Republicans.
22

•

Mobile, AL-Pensacola-Ft. Walton (“Pensacola”) includes 3 counties – Escambia,
Okaloosa, and Santa Rosa. In 2006, it had 410,289 registered voters, and white
voters represented 83% of the market, while black voters represented 11%. In
1994, Democrats held a +10 point advantage, but in 2006, Republicans held a +19
point advantage over Democrats.

Miami
West Palm
Ft. Myers
Tampa
Orlando
Jacksonville
Gainesville
Tallahassee
Panama City
Pensacola

Figure 2.1 Florida Media Markets, by county, including Alabama and Georgia overlap
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In as late as 2006, three media markets (Tampa, Miami, and Orlando) accounted for
nearly two-thirds (64%) of the state’s 10.4 million registered voters. These metropolitan
markets contain voters who are the antithesis of typical Southern regions (high percentage
of Hispanic and African American voters combined, more affluent voters, etc.). While the
five media markets in the Panhandle/Northeast only accounted for 19% of the state’s total
registered voters. However, it is expected the counties in these low population media
markets that adhere closer to the Southern political paradigm will deviate at a greater rate
from their Democratic registration than other areas of the state.
2.3 Florida Election Results
It is important to understand the candidates who ran for the office in the races being
analyzed, at least on a cursory level. 1994 was a year for change. Hugh Rodham, a MiamiDade County public defender and brother to First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, ran for
Senate against incumbent Republican Senator Connie Mack III. Though President and Mrs.
Clinton campaigned for Rodham, he did not raise much money and received little help from
Florida's Democratic establishment; additionally, he only ran one television ad10, an antigun spot (CNN, 1996). Not surprisingly, Senator Mack had a landslide victory of 70% to
30% (see figure 2.2 for senatorial election results), winning every county in the state, by
2,454,460 votes. Even in the closest county contest in the state, Gadsden County, Rodham
lost by -3 percentage points. Meanwhile the race for governor was between the incumbent

10

It is not clear if the ad was run statewide or only in specific media markets, or how often
the ad was run.
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Democrat Lawton Chiles11 and former President George H.W. Bush’s son, Jeb Bush who had
been appointed Secretary of Commerce under Governor Bob Martinez in 1987-1988. Chiles
narrowly won a victory by 51% to 49% (see figure 2.3 for all gubernatorial elections),
winning only 27 of 67 counties (37%) with 63,940 votes. So in 1994, Florida had
(re)elected a Republican Senator and Democratic Governor.
Table 2.5 1994 Florida Statewide General Election Results, by media market.
(%)
Media Market
Miami
West Palm Beach
Ft. Myers
Tampa
Orlando
Jacksonville
Gainesville
Tallahassee
Panama City
Pensacola

U.S. Senate
Dem. Rep.
40.1
59.9
33.6
66.4
22.4
77.6
26.6
73.4
25.7
74.3
25.5
74.5
34.3
65.7
34.7
65.3
23.9
76.1
18.8
81.2

Governor
Dem. Rep.
58.6
41.4
56.9
43.1
43.3
56.7
49.5
50.5
48.0
52.0
40.1
59.9
59.2
40.8
60.6
39.4
46.2
53.8
38.7
61.3

In the 1998 Senate race, Democrat incumbent Bob Graham faced state senator
(District 20, Tampa) Charlie Crist. Graham handily won by 62% to 38%, winning 63 of the
67 counties (94% of the state) by 972,652 votes. And in the 1998 governor’s race,
Republican Jeb Bush ran again, this time against Lieutenant Governor Buddy MacKay and
won with a +10 point margin (55% to 45%), this time securing 61 (21 more than his
previous run) of the state’s 67 counties (91%), with 418,051 vote margin. Again Florida
elected opposing parties for statewide offices.
11

Lawton became well-known as “Walkin’ Lawton” for his walk from Key West to
Pensacola in 1970 to gain attention for his successful bid for U.S. Senate. He served as a U.S.
Senator until his successful bid for governor in 1990.
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Table 2.6 1998 Florida Statewide General Election Results, by media market.
(%)
Media Market
Miami
West Palm Beach
Ft. Myers
Tampa
Orlando
Jacksonville
Gainesville
Tallahassee
Panama City
Pensacola

U.S. Senate
Dem. Rep.
77.3
22.7
68.1
31.9
51.1
48.9
57.2
42.8
58.6
41.4
56.6
43.4
70.4
29.6
75.4
24.6
59.7
40.3
47.4
52.6

Governor
Dem. Rep.
54.3
45.7
53.6
46.4
34.8
65.2
43.2
56.8
41.0
59.0
36.0
64.0
52.5
47.5
53.5
46.5
34.2
65.8
28.1
71.9

In order to describe Florida’s electoral environment, one cannot discuss
contemporary Florida politics without addressing the 2000 presidential election, even
though that election year is not being analyzed here. Texas Republican Governor George W.
Bush, and brother to Governor Jeb Bush, defeated Democratic Vice President Al Gore in a
hotly contested battle that ended in front of the U.S. Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore.
Ultimately, George W. Bush was judged to win by a recount of 537 Florida votes (out of
5,963,110 votes cast for president), and won 51 of the 67 counties (76%). And while not at
the same level of intensity or scrutiny, the 2004 Senatorial race between Republican and
former U.S. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Mel Martinez and former Florida
Education Commissioner and University of South Florida president Betty Castor was also
very close. Martinez won with 1.1% of the vote (49.4% to 48.3%) winning by 82,663 votes
and with support of 44 of the 67 counties (66%). These two presidential year statewide
elections further illustrate the volatility in the Florida electorate.
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And finally in 2006, Democratic incumbent Senator Bill Nelson, handily beat former
Republican former Florida Secretary of State and U.S. Congresswoman (District 13,
Sarasota) Katherine Harris, 60% to 38%, winning 57 of the 67 counties (85%) by 1,064,421
votes. In the governor’s race, then Republican Florida Attorney General Charlie Crist won
against Democratic U.S. Congressman (District 11, Tampa) Jim Davis by +7 percentage
points (52% to 45%), Crist won support in 59 counties (88%), by 341,556 votes. And once
again in the midterm election, Florida elected both a Republican and a Democrat for
statewide offices. But in the midterm election of 2010 Florida changed the electoral pattern
of mixed partisan representation on the same ballot for statewide offices12 and voted for
Republican leadership in both for senate and for governor.
Table 2.7 2006 Florida Statewide General Election Results, by media market.
(%)
Media Market
Miami
West Palm Beach
Ft. Myers
Tampa
Orlando
Jacksonville
Gainesville
Tallahassee
Panama City
Pensacola

12

U.S. Senate
Dem.
Rep.
68.4
31.6
69.3
30.7
52.7
47.3
61.0
39.0
60.3
39.7
50.5
49.5
66.6
33.4
72.5
27.5
52.8
47.2
44.6
55.4

Governor
Dem.
Rep.
58.8
41.2
55.2
44.8
35.0
65.0
44.3
55.7
43.2
56.8
35.9
64.1
52.8
47.2
54.3
45.7
36.0
64.0
32.2
67.8

The next observable occurrence for examining both offices will not happen again until

2018.
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Figure 2.2 Florida Senatorial General Elections, 1994-2006
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Figure 2.3 Florida Gubernatorial Elections, 1994-2006
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3. Hypothesis
Rural, Democratic counties in Florida are more likely than urban, Democratic
counties to vote for Democratic candidates in a lower percentage than their Democratic
registration. The following races will be examined for Democratic deviation: U.S. Senatorial
and gubernatorial races during the 1994, 1998 and 2006 general elections. The
Democratic deviation occurs due to the following reasons: continued decrease in the
percentage of registered Democrats, percentage of white voters, population log, population
density, and media market.

3.1 Data and measures
This analysis focuses on the absolute deviation of Democratic votes for senate and
governor from Democratic registration based on the effects of geography, population, and
ethnicity for each election both offices were on the same ballot. To test the propositions,
Florida aggregate election results and voter registration statistics by county were gathered
from the Florida Secretary of State Division of Elections office for the 1994, 1998, and 2006
general elections.
The dependent variable is the absolute value of the Democratic percentage of the
office (senate or governor) vote (%Doffice) minus the Democratic registration percentage
(%DRV) for each county (for the midterm elections of 1994, 1998, 2006), or the absolute
Democratic deviation (|Dd|). Or:
|%Doffice - %DRV| = Dd
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Democratic deviation reflects the absolute distance of the candidate’s total county
vote percentage from the percentage of registered Democrats in the county. For example, if
the percent registered Democratic voters was 64 and the Democratic candidate vote
percentage were 36, the Democratic deviation would be [absolute value of 36 - 64] = 28.
To evaluate the impact of Deep South politics had through TV media on Florida
county Democratic dealignment, media markets were used as dummy variables- scored 1 if
the condition is met and 0 otherwise. These variables allow for the possibility that some
years are more favorable to the candidates of one party or the other. Four media markets
are adjacent to Alabama and Georgia and two share a media market with the Deep
Southern states (Tallahassee, FL-Thomasville, GA and Pensacola, FL, Mobile, AL). Ft. Myers
media market was excluded from the analysis since it is located in the southern part of
Florida; it is most rural for that region, and heavily Republican. In all of the midterm
elections reviewed, both the Democratic Senate and Gubernatorial candidates preformed
best in terms of vote percentage in South Florida (Miami media market and West Palm
Beach media market) and in the Panhandle/Northeast (Gainesville media market and
Tallahassee media market).
To evaluate the rural effects on Democratic deviation two variables were used. First,
total voter population was converted into a natural logarithm because population is not
static and this is a better choice to evaluate exponential growth. The other predictor used
to determine the effects of rural counties was voter density. The total number of registered
voters per county was divided by the square miles of the county size. To demonstrate: the
least dense county, Liberty, had a density of 4.8 voters/square miles in 2006 (4,042 total
voters divided by the county size of 836.6 square miles), while the densest county, Pinellas,
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had a density of 2,256.9 voters/square miles in 2006 (total registration of 617,939 voters
divided by 273.8 square miles).
The percentage of Democrats (total number of registered Democrats divided by the
total number of registered voters) in the counties was used to evaluate partisan intensity.
And the percentage of white voters (total number of registered voters self-identifying as
white divided by the total number of registered voters) in the counties was used to
determine the effects white voters had on deviation.

3.2 Statistical Results of OLS
The findings presented are for six ordinary least squares regression (OLS) analysis
of county level absolute Democratic deviation utilizing SPSS 21.0 for Windows. Given that
the units of analysis are not individuals, it is not necessarily expected to see the same
relationships adhere that would be seen if analyzing a survey of voters (Robinson 1950).
1994 Senate
The overall 1994 Senate model was significant (F(13,53) = 169.68, p<0.001). The
Miami media market, Gainesville media market, Pensacola media market, percentage
Democratic registration, and percentage white registration were significant in predicting
the Democratic deviation (percent 1994 Democratic Senatorial Candidate Rodham received
minus percent 1994 Democratic registration).
•

Miami media market significantly predicted Democratic deviation (p=0.002) and
being in the Miami media market, decreases Democratic deviation by 8.665
points.
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•

Gainesville media market significantly predicted Democratic deviation (p=0.047
and being in the Gainesville media market, decreases Democratic deviation by
4.954 points.

•

Pensacola-Mobile, AL media market significantly predicted Democratic deviation
(p=0.002) and being in the Pensacola media market, increases Democratic
deviation by 8.366 points.

•

Percentage Democratic registered voters significantly predicted Democratic
deviation (p<0.001) and each percent increase in Democratic registration,
increases Democratic deviation by 0.871 points.

•

Percentage white registered voters significantly predicted Democratic deviation
(p<0.001) and each percent increase in white registration, increases Democratic
deviation by 0.411 points.

The entire regression model, including the Miami, West Palm Beach, Tampa,
Orlando, Jacksonville, Gainesville, Tallahassee, Panama City and Pensacola media markets,
natural log for total registered voters, registered voters per square mile, Democratic voters,
and white voters accounted for 97.7% of the variance in Democratic deviation.

1994 Governor
The overall 1994 Gubernatorial model was significant (F = 21.31, p<0.001). The
natural log of total registered voters, percentage Democratic registration, and percentage
white registration were significant in predicting the Democratic deviation (percent 1994
Democratic Gubernatorial Candidate Chiles received minus percent 1994 Democratic
registration).
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•

Natural log of the total registered voters significantly predicted Democratic
deviation (p=0.050) and for each unit increase in the natural log of total
registered voters, Democratic deviation decreased by 2.921 points.

•

Percentage Democratic registered voters significantly predicted Democratic
deviation (p<0.001) and each percent increase in Democratic voter registration,
causes the Democratic deviation to increase by 0.592 points.

•

Percentage white registered voters significantly predicted Democratic deviation
(p<0.05) and with each one percent increase in white registration, Democratic
deviation increased by 0.395 points.

The entire regression model, including the Miami, West Palm Beach, Tampa, Orlando,
Jacksonville, Gainesville, Tallahassee, Panama City and Pensacola media markets, natural
log for total registered voters, registered voters per square mile, Democratic voters, and
white voters accounted for 83.9% of the variance in Democratic Deviation.

1998 Senate
The overall 1998 Senate model was not significant (F = 1.473, p=.159). The Miami
media market demonstrated the only significant predictor in this weak model. The entire
regression model, including the Miami, West Palm Beach, Tampa, Orlando, Jacksonville,
Gainesville, Tallahassee, Panama City and Pensacola media markets, natural log for total
registered voters, registered voters per square mile, Democratic voters, and white voters
accounted for 26.5% (8.5% adjusted R squared)of the variance in Democratic deviation
seen in counties.
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1998 Governor
The overall 1998 Governor model was significant (F = 52.6, p<0.001). The
Gainesville media market, percentage Democratic registration and percentage white
registration were significant in predicting the Democratic deviation (percent Democratic
Gubernatorial Candidate MacKay received minus percent 1998 Democratic registration).
•

Gainesville media market significantly predicted Democratic deviation (p<0.05)
and being in the Gainesville media market, decreased the Democratic deviation
by 7.712 points.

•

Percentage Democratic registered voters significantly predicted Democratic
deviation (p<0.001) and for each percent increase in Democratic voters, the
Democratic deviation increased by 0.759 points.

•

Percentage white registered voters significantly predicted Democratic deviation
(p<0.001) and a percent increase in white registration, increased the Democratic
deviation by 0.329 points.

The entire regression model, including the Miami, West Palm Beach, Tampa, Orlando,
Jacksonville, Gainesville, Tallahassee, Panama City and Pensacola media markets, natural
log for total registered voters, registered voters per square mile, Democratic voters, and
white voters accounted for 92.8% of the variance in Democratic Deviation.

2006 Senate
The overall 2006 Senate model was significant (F = 6.41, p<0.001). The Miami media
market, natural log of the total registered voters, and percentage white registration were
significant in predicting the Democratic deviation (percent 2006 Democratic Senatorial
Candidate Nelson received minus percent 2006 Democratic registration).
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•

Miami media market significantly predicted Democratic deviation (p<0.05) and
being located in the Miami media market, decreased Democratic deviation by
10.334 points.

•

Natural log of the total registered voters significantly predicted Democratic
deviation (p<0.01) and for each unit increase in natural log of total registered
voters, Democratic deviation increased by 3.486 points.

•

White voters significantly predicted Democratic deviation (p=0.001) and a one
percent increase in white registered voters, resulted in a 0.293 point Democratic
deviation increase.

The entire regression model, including the Miami, West Palm Beach, Tampa, Orlando,
Jacksonville, Gainesville, Tallahassee, Panama City and Pensacola media markets, natural
log for total registered voters, registered voters per square mile, Democratic voters, and
white voters accounted for 61.1% of the variance in Democratic Deviation.

2006 Governor
The overall 1994 Senate model was significant (F = 169.68, p<0.001). Miami media
market, Gainesville media market, Pensacola media market, percentage Democratic
registration, and percentage white registration were significant in predicting the
Democratic deviation (percent 2006 Democratic Gubernatorial Candidate Davis received
minus 2006 percent Democratic registration).
•

Miami media market significantly predicted Democratic deviation (p<0.05) and
being located within the Miami media market, increased the Democratic
deviation by 9.24 points.
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•

Percentage Democratic registered voters significantly predicted Democratic
deviation (p<0.001) and with each percent increase in Democratic voters, the
Democratic deviation increased by 0.565 points.

•

Percentage white registered voter significantly predicted Democratic deviation
(p=0.001) and a percent increase in white voters, increased Democratic
deviation by 0.27 points.

The entire regression model, including the Miami, West Palm Beach, Tampa, Orlando,
Jacksonville, Gainesville, Tallahassee, Panama City and Pensacola media markets, natural
log for total registered voters, registered voters per square mile, Democratic voters, and
white voters accounted for 80.7% of the variance in Democratic deviation.
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Table 3.1 Explaining Florida County-level Democratic deviation
1994
Senate
Intercept

1998
Gov

Senate

2006
Gov

Senate

Gov

Voter Density (Voters
per square mile)
Percent Democrat
Registered Voters
Percent White
Registered Voters

-41.624 -20.189 -17.632 -27.550 -51.357 -28.849
(13.38) (27.769) (27.741) (19.859) (21.336) (18.664)
-8.665*
9.24*
-4.909
15.434
.268 10.334*
(2.729) (5.663) (6.100)
(4.075)
(4.367) (4.658)
.99
-3.924
2.149
6.195
.88
6.668
(2.150) (4.463)
(4.776) (3.419) (3.720) (3.254)
.99
-3.924
2.149
6.195
.88
6.668
(1.932)
(4.01)
(4.245) (3.039) (3.299) (2.886)
-.528
-.212
-4.467
4.285
-4.241
5.756
(1.892) (3.927)
(2.875)
(4.205)
-3.01
(3.287)
3.685
.711
6.049
.062
4.868
-1.91
(1.954) (4.056)
(4.233) (3.031) (3.198) (2.797)
-4.954*
-4.311
-8.171
-.279 -7.712*
-4.081
(2.441) (5.067)
(5.358) (3.836) (4.080) (3.569)
2.307
-2.484
-3.334
.47
-3.08
1.583
(2.229) (4.626)
(3.215)
(4.856) (3.476) (3.675)
2.804
-1.401
-3.218
.269
1.221
.082
(2.141) (4.444)
(4.692) (3.359) (3.535) (3.092)
8.366*
-2.186
-.882
-6.067
6.895
-3.327
(2.525) (5.241)
(5.551) (3.974) (4.325) (3.783)
-1.372
-.674
-2.921*
.733
-2.249
3.486*
(0.703) (1.459)
(1.071)
(1.604) (1.148) (1.224)
.001
.003
.01
.004
.006
.001
(0.002) (0.005)
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
.871**
.565**
.592**
.102
.759**
.058
(0.051) (0.107)
(0.114) (0.082)
-0.100 (0.087)
.411**
.27**
.395*
.189
.329**
.293**
(0.069) (0.144)
(0.074)
(0.116) (0.083) (0.084)

N
F-test

67
169.682

67

67

67

67

67

21.313

1.473

52.596

6.410

17.088

Sig. of F

p ≤ .001

p ≤ .001

0.159

p ≤ .001

p ≤ .001

p ≤ .001

0.839
0.265
0.928
Adj.
0.971
0.800
0.085
0.910
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates. Standard Errors in Parentheses.
* p < 0.05, **p<0.001

0.611

0.807

0.516

0.760

Miami-Ft. Lauderdale
West Palm Beach- Ft.
Pierce
Tampa-St.
Petersburg-Sarasota
Orlando-Daytona
Beach-Melbourne
Jacksonville
Gainesville
Tallahassee, FLThomasville, GA
Panama City
Pensacola/Ft.
Walton,FL-Mobile, AL
Voter Population-LN

R2

0.977

R2
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3.3 Findings
Various media markets were significant in four of the models but aside from the
1994 senate model, no media market adequately explains the theory that counties which
share media markets with Deep South counties will result in a Southern lag. Pensacola and
Gainesville were both statistically significant in the 1994 senate model. Not surprisingly,
deviation increases when voters live in the Pensacola media market and Democrats still
maintained a net +9.5 point advantage over Republicans. Voters in the Gainesville media
market had the inverse effect on deviation- reducing it by nearly 5 points (-4.95). And while
this 1994 senate model points toward the validity of the Southern lag theory based on
cross TV media influencing Democratic deviation, unfortunately neither of the other media
markets of Jacksonville, Tallahassee, or Panama City media markets show significance in
any of the other models. The Gainesville media market is a significant predictor in the
decline of Democratic deviation in the 1998 governor model, but it is insufficient to make
extrapolations based on two occurrences. And the South Florida Miami media market was a
significant predictor of deviation in three of the five relevant models, but is well outside the
Deep South proximity.
Neither of the population variables created to test the influence of rural counties on
deviation indicated consistent significance. In fact, voter density exhibited no significance
in any model run. Voter population-LN did demonstrate significance in two of the modes:
the 1994 governor model and the 2006 senatorial race. But again, this is not sufficient to
support the Southern lag theory. Previous research supports that voters in rural counties
are realigning to the Republican Party (Black and Black 2002; Gimpel and Karnes 2006;
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McKee 2010); however, these rural variables were not adequate to determine Democratic
deviation in Florida.
The percent of Democratic voters in a county was a significant predictor in four of
the five relevant models. It demonstrated consistent significance in all three governor
models and the 1994 senate model. It indicates that superficially high percentages of
Democratic registration will result in more deviation in the votes for the Democratic
candidate. This supports part of the Southern lag theory that voters are remaining as
registered Democrats but in name only. Counties with inflated levels of Democrats do not
support their party candidates.
Expectedly when analyzing Southern politics white voters play a prominent role.
The percent of white voters in a county was the most significant indictor of Democratic
deviation in five out of the five pertinent models run in this analysis. As discussed earlier,
the Republican reversal of party control has brought with it the realignment of white
voters. Republicans have appealed to, and peeled away white conservatives which have
defused the advantages of white moderates among Democrats. Looking at this analysis
over time supports the contention that the intensity of the impact of white voters on the
Democratic vote is gradually declining. Comparing the difference between senate and
gubernatorial candidates in the same election year is negligible, but the intensity of whites
on deviation gradually declines from 1994 to 2006. The percent of white voters in a county
in the 1994 senate model increased Democratic deviation by .411, and in the 2006 senate
model, each percentage of white voters were responsible for .293 increase in deviation.
These findings support that whites play an important role in Democratic deviation
occurrence and that the less diverse a county is the higher the deviation. This supports the
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Southern lag theory that counties which have similar demographics to the Deep South will
follow those voting trends. Many counties in the Panhandle/Northeast have a high
percentage of white voters, but so do counties in the West Coastal region of the state.
Florida is exhibiting some Southern voting trends, and with it the share of Southern white
voters with strong long-term ties to the Democrats has shrunk (Lubin, 2004).

4. Conclusion
Over the six OLS regressions performed to study the effects of Democratic deviation,
the theory of rural counties near the Deep South, with low populations and high
Democratic and high white registration did not fully realize. When all statistically
significant regressions (5) are compared, the percentage of white voters is a constant
predictor of deviation. And percentage of Democratic voters is a significant predictor
variable in four out of five working models. However, the other variables were not
successful causes in Democratic deviation.
There are may have been unobserved characteristics which influenced the findings.
Most importantly, are the candidates and the effects they have on vote percentage was not
factored into the analysis. All three of the senate races had large vote margins which may
have unduly inflated the deviation. For example, Hugh Rodham was a low profile candidate
with ties to the Clintons; Katherine Harris was a polarizing figure who ran a shoddy
campaign, and Charlie Crist was a virtual unknown against a popular incumbent. All these
could be additional factors effecting deviation. As well as the incumbency effect candidates
use as political capital.
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There are strategic implications that can be taken from this research. Republicans
can increase their vote margins and exploit the Democratic deviation by targeting counties
with high percentage of white voters, and identifying conservative white voters who are
receptive to deviate from their Democratic registration. Republican strategists should
target counties with low non-white voters and inflated Democratic registration; counties
with more competitive Democratic registration advantage (less than 15%) will be more
difficult in persuasion. On the hand, Democratic strategists would do well to focus on the
counties within the Miami and Gainesville media markets, and to identify moderate white
voters in high white voter counties who deviate less from the Democratic Party than do
conservative whites.
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